Affirming the findings of fact and conclusions of law of a panel of the Commission on Judicial Conduct following a hearing, the Kansas Supreme Court suspended a judge without pay for 1 year for (1) frequently using the word “f**k” and its derivatives when speaking at the courthouse; (2) using derogatory terms when referring to women; and (3) using the phrase “Kansas boy” to describe a young black male defendant. In the Matter of Cullins (Kansas Supreme Court February 26, 2021). The Court stayed the suspension for 60 days for the judge to submit a plan for counseling and training. If the Court approves the plan, it will stay part or all of the suspension during the plan’s term; if the judge successfully completes the plan, the Court will consider waiving any remaining suspension.
(1) The Court held that the use of “f**k” “is unprofessional and—almost always—undignified for a judge,” violating the rule requiring a judge to treat everyone with patience, dignity, and courtesy. In response to the panel finding that the judge had also violated the rule requiring a judge to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary,” the judge argued that the F-word is ubiquitous “in the current culture’s vernacular” and “cussing is so common in Southeast Kansas” that it does not reflect negatively on character. The Court concluded that the judge’s “offensive conduct went far beyond any undignified and unprofessional use of the word ‘f**k’” and that his “aggressiveness; his reference to a female litigant as ‘crazy’; his overt and public humiliation” of the chief clerk; and “his loud, angry, and expletive-filled reprimand” of a court clerk “collectively” violated the rule.
The judge also argued that his profanity could not have undermined public confidence in the judiciary because the incidents “did not occur in a public forum.” However, the Court noted that at least 2 incidents had occurred or could be heard in a hallway near members of the public. Further, the Court explained that the judge’s argument “defies logic” by suggesting that his “conduct has not been discussed in the community by the people who witnessed it.”
The judge also argued in his defense that he was often fair to court staff. The Court stated that, “while that may be true, good behavior on some—even most—occasions does not disprove misbehavior on other occasions.” Further, it emphasized that good behavior did not “override” code violations, but at most was relevant as mitigation for discipline. It explained: “Frankly, good behavior, while commendable in a judge, is also expected.”
(2) The panel had concluded that the judge’s “use of derogatory words,” particularly “b***ch” and “c**t,” to describe women manifested a clear bias based upon sex and “was hostile toward the individuals about whom he was speaking. . . . Intentionally gender-based derogatory references toward women have no place in the administration of justice, and have no place in a judge’s vernacular.” (The Court noted that a minority of the justices believed that there was no showing of bias against females generally but only bias against certain females.)
The judge asserted that his statements did not violate the code because he did not make them while performing judicial duties, that is, “during or in relation to any matter he was adjudicating” or while performing administrative duties. The Court rejected that argument:
Respondent interprets “judicial duties,” including his administrative duties, too narrowly. While in the courthouse—when court business of every kind was being addressed—Respondent was present in his official capacity as a district judge, and sometimes also as chief judge. A judge does not lose his mantle of authority when he steps out of his chambers into a hallway. A judge’s performance of “judicial duties” occurs constantly in the courthouse during the course of any given day. . . . Those duties include the times a judge presides over hearings, completes administrative reports, and evaluates employees, but they also include those occasions when a judge discusses employee performance with attorneys and other staff; admonishes persons waiting in the hall to be quieter so as not to disrupt court proceedings; offers to assist a wandering law enforcement officer who needs an application for search warrant reviewed; directs a member of the public to the right courtroom; addresses a complaint; and deals with innumerable other things that require a judge’s professional attention, judgment, and decision throughout the day.
(3) During a bond hearing for a young black male student at a local college, the judge asked, “Can I assume you’re not even a Kansas boy?” There was a second bond hearing also involving a young black male student immediately afterward.
The judge testified that he did not intend the term “boy” to have any racial connotation, that he considers himself a “Chautauqua County boy,” and that his reference to the young man as “a Kansas boy” was similar. The panel found that the judge’s testimony was credible and that he did not intend the term as a term of racial derision, noting “geographic origin was relevant for proper administration of the bond hearing, and the men were teenagers.”
Noting that “words and phrases . . . are important,” the Court concluded that, “regardless of inflection, tone, or local custom,” the judge’s conduct “during these bond hearings created a reasonable perception of racial bias . . . .” It explained:
Specifically, two adult Black men appeared before the judge during a bond hearing, both presumed innocent of their criminal charges. A reasonable individual might perceive that the following may have shown racial bias:
• Something about the defendants’ appearance caused the judge to believe they were athletes;
• Something about their appearance caused the judge to assume they were not from the area;
• Something about their appearance caused the judge to question—even disbelieve—one defendant’s assertion that he had no felony record; and
• During the judge’s comments he used a term — “boy”— that has been used at times in the past as a common and well-known slur against Black men.
The Court concluded that, “when taken altogether and in context, a reasonable perception of bias cannot be denied.”
In mitigation, the judge stated that he is efficient, fair in his hearings, and “does not mean to hurt or harm” but “is just ‘salty.’” The Court found that the judge’s conduct “quite troubling. He has intimidated and publicly humiliated court employees. He has shown bias and the appearance of bias by his insulting and careless remarks, even while on the bench and presiding over hearings. By his coarse language in the courthouse, he has sullied the dignity and propriety of the judiciary.”