Following a hearing on a complaint filed by the Judicial Inquiry Board, the Illinois Courts Commission removed a judge from office for (1) reversing his finding that a defendant was guilty of sexual assault to circumvent the law requiring a mandatory prison sentence; (2) giving false and misleading testimony in the discipline proceedings when he claimed that he reversed his finding for lack of evidence, not to circumvent the law; and (3) ordering a prosecutor to leave the courtroom in retaliation for the prosecutor “liking” a post on social media criticizing the judge.  In re Adrian, Order (Illinois Courts Commission February 23, 2024).

Beginning on October 13, 2021, the judge presided over a bench trial in which Drew Clinton was charged with 3 counts of criminal sexual assault against a 16-year-old victim.  On October 15, the judge found Clinton not guilty on the first 2 counts but guilty on the third count of criminal sexual assault.  The judge continued the case to January 3, 2022 for post-trial motions and sentencing.  The state’s attorney requested that Clinton’s bond be revoked because the guilty finding required a mandatory prison term.  The judge revoked Clinton’s bond, and he was taken into custody.

On October 19, the defense filed 2 post-trial motions, requesting a judgment of not guilty on count three, a new trial, or a finding that the mandatory minimum 4-year prison term was unconstitutional and a sentence of probation.

On January 3, 2022, after hearing arguments on the post-trial motions and sentencing, the judge stated:

This Court is required to do justice.  This Court is required to do justice by the public, it’s required to do justice by me, and it’s required to do justice by God.

It’s a mandatory sentence to the Department of Corrections.  This happened when this teenager – because he was and is a teenager, was two weeks past 18 years old.  He has no prior record, none whatsoever.  By law, the Court is supposed to sentence this young man to the Department of Corrections.  This Court will not do that.  That is not just.  There is no way for what happened in this case that this teenager should go to the Department of Corrections.  I will not do that.

The Court could find that the sentencing statute for this offense is unconstitutional as applied to this Defendant.  But that’s not going to solve the problem because, if the Court does that, this Court will be reversed by the Appellate Court, and Mr. Clinton will end up in the Department of Corrections.

Mr. Clinton has served almost five months in the county jail, 148 days.  For what happened in this case, that is plenty of punishment.  That would be a just sentence.  The Court can’t do that.

But what the Court can do, because this was a bench trial, the Court will find that the People failed to prove their case on Count 3.  The Court is going to reconsider its verdict, is going to find the Defendant not guilty on Count 3.  And, therefore, the case – the Defendant will be released from custody.  Bond will be discharged.

He then entered an order stating, “The Court, sua sponte, reverses the prior finding of guilty on Count 3 and makes a finding of not guilty.”

There were local, national, and international news reports about the judge’s decision.  The judge “was ‘blindsided’ by the reaction from the press; he was called names, attacked, and people were threatening him and his family.”

In the discipline proceeding, the judge claimed that he reversed his guilty finding after reconsidering the evidence and concluding that the State had failed to prove its case.  Rejecting that argument, the Commission noted that, in the January 3, 2022 hearing, the judge had “said nothing about the evidence, the burden of proof, or why he thought the case had not been proven.”  Further, the Commission emphasized:

Respondent’s statements at the hearing were clear and unambiguous.  Although respondent has asked this Commission to do so, we will not infer a different meaning to respondent’s words than what his plain language conveyed, particularly when the public only heard what respondent said, not what he now claims he meant. . . .

For example, the Commission noted that the judge began the hearing by stating that he was required to sentence Clinton to a mandatory prison term, but that he would not “do that” to Clinton, a teenager with no prior record.  The Commission found that the judge’s after-the-fact explanation that he had meant that he would not sentence Clinton to prison when he was not guilty “is not believable.  To any reasonable person hearing respondent’s words, respondent was refusing to sentence Clinton to a mandatory prison term ‘for what happened in [the] case’ because he did not believe prison was a ‘just’ sentence under the circumstances.”  Further, the Commission emphasized that the order “says, in no uncertain terms, that respondent reversed his finding of guilty ‘sua sponte,’” demonstrating that he was not granting Clinton’s post-trial motions but “acting on his own initiative.”

The Commission also noted that, although the judge claimed that immediately after the trial he began to consider “whether he had mistakenly found Clinton guilty,” he did not act on those purported doubts for months while Clinton remained in jail.  The Commission did “not believe or accept that a judge, who honestly thought a defendant was wrongly convicted of the offenses charged, would not swiftly take action to correct this injustice.  No judge who honors and follows the law would ever permit an innocent person to languish in jail.”  It further found “troubling,” “revealing,” “repugnant,” and egregious, the judge’s admission that rather than admit he had mistakenly found Clinton guilty, he considered sentencing Clinton to probation, in other words, to impose a criminal penalty on someone the judge claimed he thought was innocent.

The Commission concluded:

Respondent reversed his guilty finding to thwart and intentionally circumvent the law which required a mandatory prison sentence.  Respondent openly acknowledged that if he imposed a lesser sentence than the statute required, he would be reversed by the appellate court.  So rather than comply with the law, he devised a way to subvert it.

The Commission noted that “abuse of judicial discretion does not usually constitute judicial misconduct, particularly in the sentencing context,” but that there are exceptions, “including when a judge makes a decision in bad faith; or, in other words, for any purpose other than the judge’s faithful discharge of judicial duties. . . .”  It found that the judge had acted in bad faith “when he intentionally circumvented the law by reversing his prior guilty finding. . . .  There is no question that a judge’s violation of the law offends the Code of Judicial Conduct.”

In 2023, there were approximately 121 public dispositions in state judicial discipline proceedings.

• 7 judges were removed from office.
• 15 judges or former judges publicly agreed to resign or retire and never serve in judicial office again; 1 now-former judge also agreed to a public censure, and 1 also agreed to a public admonishment.
• 4 former judges were barred from judicial office; in 1 of those cases, the former judge also agreed to a public censure.
• 10 judges were suspended without pay as a final sanction.  The length of the suspensions ranged from 7 days to 1 year.
  • 1 judge was suspended for 7 days.
  • 1 judge was suspended for 14 days.
  • 2 suspensions were for 30 days; 1 included a reprimand, 1 included a censure.
  • 1 judge was suspended for 45 days.
  • 1 judge was suspended for 60 days, fined $1,500, and reprimanded.
  • 1 judge was suspended for 6 months, fined $5,000, and required to comply for 2 years with his monitoring agreement with the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program.
  • 1 judge was suspended for 6 months and censured.
  • 1 judge was suspended for 200 days.
  • 1 judge was suspended for 1 year.
• 75  judges (or former judges in approximately 14 cases) received public censures, reprimands, admonishments, or warnings.  6 of those reproofs also ordered remedial measures such as training, counseling, or mentoring.
  • There were 16 censures; 1 of the censures was severe.
  • There were 33 reprimands; 1 of the reprimands was severe; 1 also included a $15,000 fine and probation.
  • There were 24 admonishments.
  • There were 2 warnings.
• 4 former judges were sanctioned in attorney discipline proceedings for conduct while they were judges; 1 was publicly censured, 1 was disbarred, 1 was suspended from the practice of law for 2 years, and 1 was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
• 3 judges were ordered to cease and desist certain conduct.
• 1 judge was issued an informal adjustment.
• 1 judge received a private admonishment that was made public based on his waiver of confidentiality.
• 1 former judge was conditionally suspended for 6 years; the suspension will only take effect if the former judge is elected or appointed to the bench within 6 years.

In addition, there are at least 6 cases currently pending on review.

Approximately 60% of the cases were resolved pursuant to an agreement.  “Judge” refers to any type of judicial officer, whether full-time or part-time, including supreme court and appellate court justices, justices of the peace, magistrates, pro tem judges, referees, court commissioners, and hearing officers.

The Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission recently disclosed its letter cautioning a judge about her treatment of a cancer patient who had been cited for failing to keep his property free of weeds, trees, or other nuisance vegetation, although it dismissed the complaint against the judge.  Letter to Krot (Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission July 5, 2022).  The letter is marked “personal and confidential,” and under the Commission’s rules, it ordinarily would not be public, but the Commission’s post includes her name because the judge waived her right to confidentiality “in recognition of the public interest in this incident,” which received extensive, national media coverage.  In the letter, the Commission notes that the judge had self-reported her conduct although she was not required to do so and had “candidly acknowledged that [her] tone and words . . . were neither dignified nor courteous and were completely inappropriate.” 

On January 10, 2022, Burhan Chowdhury appeared before the judge on Zoom in response to a ticket for a code violation; his son also appeared.  A picture shared on the screen showed overgrown vegetation around a garage in an alley.  During the hearing, Chowdhury told the judge that he had cancer, was very old and weak, and could not look after “these things.”  

The judge responded that Chowdhury should be ashamed of himself and that she would give him jail time if she could.  She fined him $100 and told him to get the area cleaned up, as its appearance was “totally inappropriate.”  When Chowdhury’s son asked if the fine was forgivable, explaining that his father had been ill and that the area had been cleaned prior to the hearing, the judge “asked whether he had seen the photo of the area, then stated in a raised voice that it was shameful and that the neighbors should not have to view it, adding that ‘if you come back here — with your yard looking like that, you’re going to jail.’”  The Commission noted that the “threat was particularly inappropriate, as a jail sentence is not an option for a civil infraction.” 

The Commission’s letter stated that the judge’s reaction may have been due in part to her disappointment that many local homeowners have neglected their property, her unusually heavy docket that day, and her frustration that the city’s lag in using screen share was slowing the day’s proceedings.  The Commission also acknowledged that the judge had learned that she had a significant health issue shortly before the hearing.

However, the Commission cautioned that “a judge cannot allow circumstances, such as those you faced when the Chowdhurys were before you, unduly to influence the way they treat litigants,” warning her “to adhere to the letter and spirit of these canons in the future . . . .”  The Commission explained to the judge:  “You deprived Mr. Chowdhury of his right to provide his explanation for the overgrown vegetation; whether intended by you or not, your interaction caused him humiliation; and you reacted with excessive anger toward an individual appearing before you for the first time, and doing so for a minor infraction.”

The Commission commended the judge for acknowledging her error, taking responsibility without attempting to excuse her conduct, and publicly apologizing, and accepted that her treatment of the Chowdhurys was not racist or otherwise biased.  Noting that she had an unblemished discipline history, the Commission stated that it was confident that her conduct at the hearing was an “aberration” and that there is “no risk of repetition” but informed the judge that it could consider the incident “in the event of future misconduct.”

* * *

If an investigation produces some evidence of misconduct, but the misconduct is relatively minor, most judicial conduct commissions can resolve a complaint about a judge with a private sanction or confidential informal disposition.  Depending on the state, private dispositions are called:

• Private censures, reprimands, admonitions, or warnings;
• Letters of admonition, counsel, caution, advice, or correction;
• Dismissals with caution, admonition, explanation, concern, or warning; or
• Orders of additional education, cease and desist orders, or adjustments.

Several judicial conduct commissions summarize their private dispositions in their annual reports.  The commissions with this practice include:  the California Commission on Judicial Performance, the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities, the Massachusetts Commission on Judicial Conduct, the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission, the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards, the New Mexico Judicial Standards Commission, the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, the Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board, and the Utah Judicial Conduct Commission.  The California Commission explains that it provides synopses of private admonishments and advisory letters “to educate judges and the public, and to assist judges in avoiding inappropriate conduct;” it acknowledges that because “certain details of the cases have been omitted or obscured” to maintain confidentiality, the summaries are “less informative than they otherwise might be” but notes its belief that “it is better to describe the conduct in abbreviated form than to omit the summaries altogether.”  Summaries of private discipline since 1998 are available on the Commission’s website.

In addition, several commissions post on their websites redacted or abridged versions of their private dispositions when they are issued.  For example, as reflected on their websites, so far in 2022, the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct has issued private admonitions or warnings to and/or ordered additional education for 18 judges.  and the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct has dismissed with warning or advisory letters complaints against 8 judges filed in 2021.

Many commissions and courts can impose conditions on judges in judicial discipline cases.  For example, the rule in Indiana provides:  “Upon a finding of misconduct . . . or disability . . . , the Supreme Court may impose . . . limitations or conditions on the performance of judicial duties,” alone or in combination with other sanctions.  In 2019, conditions were imposed in over 20 cases, usually with the judge’s agreement.

For example, as part of a stipulation, a judge who was publicly admonished for delays of 392 days and 132 days in deciding 2 family law cases agreed to maintain a list so that pending matters will be regularly brought to his attention and, every 3 months for a year, to affirm in writing that he has no matters with decisions pending beyond 90 days to the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct.  In re Fennessy, Stipulation, agreement, and order (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 26, 2019).

In several discipline cases, judges were required to undergo a psychological assessment as part of the sanction.  For example, the Maryland Court of Appeals conditioned a judge’s reinstatement after a 6-month suspension without pay on an emotional and behavioral assessment by a qualified health care professional.  The judge was required to “fully cooperate in the health care evaluation and comply with the recommended course of treatment, including counselling, if any;” and, if and when she applies for reinstatement, to provide the Commission of Judicial Disabilities and the Court “a written report from the evaluating health care professional or professionals” about her current medical condition, including any reason why she should not be reinstated as a district court judge.  The judge had (1) failed to treat other judges and courthouse staff with dignity and respect, including repeatedly yelling at court clerks and judges, subjecting court clerks to line-ups when clerical mistakes were made, physically pushing a clerk, and repeatedly attempting to undermine the authority of the administrative judge and (2) abdicated her duty to handle and process search warrant materials as required by statute and instructed a law clerk to destroy warrant materials.  In the Matter of Russell, 211 A.3d 426 (Maryland 2019).

In 2 unrelated cases, the Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline placed judges on probation in addition to sanctioning them and ordered them to complete any treatment complete any recommended treatment by licensed psychologists following a psychological and psychosocial assessments.

In In re Muth, Opinion (October 31, 2018), 220 A.3d 1220 (Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline 2019), the Court suspended a  judge for 45 days without pay and fined him $5,000 for (1) viewing images of naked and partially naked women while in his office and (2) having judicial employees grade papers and make copies of handouts on the court’s copier for classes he was teaching.  The purpose of the psychosocial assessment, the Court stated, was “to determine the cognitive, behavioral and emotional motivation leading to the inappropriate sexualized behavior . . . .”

In In re Maruszczak, Opinion (January 9, 2019), Opinion (Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline October 4, 2019), the Court publicly reprimanded a judge for, during his re-election campaign, publicly confronting 3 people who supported his opponent and yelling at them, insulting them, and threatening them.  The purpose of the psychological assessment, the Court explained, was “to assess impulse control and anger related issues.“

See also Inquiry Concerning Lemonidis, 283 So. 3d 799 (Florida 2019) (agreeing that a judge continue stress management counseling in addition to a public reprimand, pursuant to a stipulation, for her comments in 2 criminal cases).

The condition most often imposed is a requirement of additional education, often with a mentor.

For example, a judge agreed to participate in a mentoring program he would develop in consultation with the chief judge when he agreed to be publicly reprimanded by the Vermont Judicial Conduct Board for directly contacting attorneys, including attorneys who appeared before him, to ask them to be part of a campaign committee.  In re Glennon, Public reprimand with order (Vermont Judicial Conduct Board August 28, 2019), pursuant to a stipulation.

Ordering instruction with a mentor is an option often imposed by the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct.

• The Commission publicly reprimanded a judge for pulling traffic citations to have an assistant district attorney file a motion to dismiss and/or provide other preferential treatment and ordered that he receive 20 hours of additional instruction with a mentor about traffic citations and warrants. Public Reprimand of Trejo and Order of Additional Education (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 26, 2019).
• The Commission publicly warned a judge for refusing to allow a litigant to review and copy the charging documents in his case unless and until he entered a plea and for her policy and practice with respect to requests for access to court files; the Commission also ordered the judge to receive 2 hours of instruction with a mentor on public access to court records and responding to requests for court records. Public Warning of Baggett and Order of Additional Education (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct August 8, 2019).
• The Commission publicly admonished a judge for invoking her judicial position during a telephone conversation with a man she believed was the estranged husband of a woman she believed was cohabitating with her estranged husband; the Commission also ordered that she receive 2 hours of instruction with a mentor, particularly on judicial ethics and professionalism. Public Admonition of Rocha and Order of Additional Education (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct August 26, 2019).

Both the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct and the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline ordered judges to complete the web-based course, “Ethics and Judging:  Reaching Higher Ground,” offered by the National Judicial College.  Guerrero, Order (Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct March 29, 2019) (reprimand for threatening to hold 2 police officers in contempt for failing to comply with his order to arrest a woman for violating a harassment injunction entered in a proceeding from which the judge had recused himself); In the Matter of Jasperson, Stipulation and order of consent (Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline July 23, 2019) (reprimand for ordering a landlord jailed for contempt without following the law).

The Nevada Commission also ordered 2 judges to attend at their own expense other specific courses at the National Judicial College, which is located in Reno, Nevada.

• The Commission publicly censured a judge for using an alternate judge whenever it was his turn to act as on-call search warrant judge for 4 years and failing to cooperate with 3 chief judges and ordered the judge to attend the NJC course “Leadership for Judges.” In the Matter of Hastings, Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and imposition of discipline (Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline March 6, 2019).
• The Commission publicly admonished a hearing master for ignoring an attorney’s objections to her questioning of a juvenile defendant, interfering with the attorney-client privilege and relationship, yelling at the attorney, attempting to pressure the juvenile into answering her questions by telling her that her probation would be increased if she refused, preventing the attorney from making a record on his objection, and threatening to contact the attorney’s boss; the Commission also ordered the judge to complete “Managing Challenging Family Law Cases: A Practical Approach” at the NJC.  In the Matter of Henry, Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and imposition of discipline (Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline December 12, 2019).

Other examples of education requirements:

• Based on an agreement, the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a judge for sharing partisan posts on Facebook. The judge also agreed to complete a program addressing ethical issues and the use of social media; to refrain from making any comments or disseminating any substantially similar social media posts; and to keep his social media platforms private.  Lammey (Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct November 15, 2019).
• Based on a stipulation and agreement, the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a judge for, without notice or a reasonable evidentiary basis, entering an order in a case to which he was not assigned that gratuitously attacked the character of 2 attorney. The judge also agreed to participate in 4 hours of judicial ethics training, not to repeat his conduct, and to read the code of judicial conduct.  In re Spanner, Stipulation, agreement, and order (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct November 22, 2019).

In 2019, as a result of state disciplinary proceedings, 2 judges were removed from office.  (2 other judges were removed by conduct commissions, but those decisions were under review at the end of the year and, therefore, not included in the count for 2019.)  In addition, 15 judges or former judges resigned or retired in lieu of discipline pursuant to public agreements with conduct commissions; 1 of those former judges was also reprimanded.  2 judges were retired for disability.

16 judges were suspended without pay as a final sanction.  The suspensions ranged from 5 days to 1 year, although the 1-year suspension was stayed conditioned on the judge engaging in no further misconduct.  The other suspensions were for 7 days, 3 weeks, 28 days, 30 days (3 judges), 45 days (3 judges), 60 days (3 judges), 90 days, and 6 months (3 judges).  The 90-day suspension also included a $5,000 fine and public reprimand; one 45-day suspension also included a $5,000 fine; one 30-day suspension also included a $500 fine and public reprimand; the 28-day suspension also included a public censure.  The reinstatement of one of the judges suspended for 60 days was conditioned on her undergoing an emotional and behavioral assessment by a health care professional and completing a judicial ethics course.

86 judges (or former judges in 11 cases) received public censures, reprimands, admonishments, warnings, or letters of counsel.

• There were 16 censures, 1 of which was severe. In addition to being censured, 1 former judge was barred from serving in judicial office in the state; 1 former judge was permanently barred from serving in judicial office in the state and ordered to pay restitution; 1 former judge’s law license was annulled, he was permanently enjoined from seeking public office in the state, fined $3,000, and reprimanded; 2 former judges were permanently enjoined from serving in public office and fined $1,000; and 1 judge was ordered to attend a course at the National Judicial College.
• There were 36 reprimands. 1 reprimand included a $5,000 fine; 1 included a $1,683 fine; 2 included $500 fines; and 10 included requirements such as mentoring, training, stress management, probation, compliance with a lawyers assistance program agreement, or a psychological assessment.
• There were 20 public admonishments. In several cases, the admonishments included conditions such as training.
• There were 9 public warnings. 1 also ordered additional education.
• 1 letter of counsel was made public with the judge’s consent.
• 1 retired judge was suspended from eligibility as a reserve judge for 3 years
• 3 former judges had their law licenses suspended in attorney discipline proceedings for conduct while they were judges. 1 suspension was indefinite; 1 was for 6 months; 1 was for 1 year with 6 months stayed.

“Judge” refers to any type of judicial officer including justices, magistrates, court commissioners, and hearing officers, whether full-time or part-time.  Approximately half of the sanctions were entered pursuant to an agreement with the judge or former judge.