Monthly Archives: June 2015

Before the bench

Posted on by

Agreeing with the recommendation of the hearing panel of the Judicial Qualifications Commission, the Florida Supreme Court recently removed a judge for her deceptive pre-bench conduct as an attorney toward her clients and co-counsel in the settlement of multi-party litigation.  Inquiry Concerning Watson (June 18, 2015).  Rejecting the judge’s “protestations to the contrary” and citing previous cases, the Court reiterated that it has jurisdiction over misconduct committed by an attorney who subsequently becomes a judge, “no matter how remote.”  Indeed, the Florida constitution states that the Commission “shall have jurisdiction over justices and judges regarding allegations that misconduct occurred before or during service as a justice or judge . . . .”

Other states have similar provisions.  For example, the rules of the Arkansas Commission on Judicial Discipline & Disability state that the Commission “shall have jurisdiction over allegations of misconduct occurring prior to or during service as a judge . . . .”  Rules provide that the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications “shall have jurisdiction over conduct committed by a judicial officer, whether or not related to the judicial office and whether or not committed during the judicial officer’s term of office.”

The Nebraska Supreme Court suspended a judge for 6 months without pay for altering a copy of a police report in a criminal case while he was a county attorney 17 years earlier, providing the altered report to defense counsel, and asking the police officer who wrote the report to alter either his original report or his testimony to conform to the changes.  In re Krepela, 628 N.W.2d 262 (Nebraska 2001).  Previously, the Court had dismissed an action against the same judge, for the same conduct, bought by the Counsel for Discipline of the State Bar Association.  State of Nebraska ex rel. State Bar Association v. Krepela, 610 N.W.2d 1 (Nebraska 2000).  The Court explained that, if a judge were disbarred or suspended as a result of charges filed by the Bar, the judge would effectively be removed by a means other than that set forth in the constitution.  The Court also concluded that allowing Disciplinary Counsel to proceed against judges would compromise the independence of the judiciary.

In contrast, in In re Burrell, 6 S.W.3d 869 (Missouri 1999), the Missouri Supreme Court held that the Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline did not have jurisdiction over a new judge for conduct during his campaign for office.  The section in the state constitution that establishes the Commission provides that “the commission shall receive and investigate . . . all complaints concerning misconduct of all judges . . . .”  The Court concluded that section only addressed the misconduct of sitting judges and held that only attorney discipline authorities had jurisdiction to prosecute claims of pre-bench misconduct.

Some states have provisions giving attorney discipline authorities jurisdiction over pre-bench conduct by judges, although it is not always clear if this jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent with that of the judicial conduct commission.  For example, rules in Alabama provide that “Incumbent judges are subject to the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Commission and the Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar during their terms of office for misconduct occurring before they became judges.”  The rules of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline state:

Conduct by a Judge or former Judge that involves grounds for disciplinary action . . . and/or may involve grounds for a violation of Colo. [Rules of Professional Conduct] may be referred by the Commission to Attorney Regulation.  Such referral shall not preclude the Commission from proceedings concerning conduct under its jurisdiction coincident with Attorney Regulation’s jurisdiction over violations of Colo. RPC.  Nothing in these Rules shall be construed to limit the jurisdiction of Attorney Regulation over an attorney with respect to conduct subject to Colo. RPC, which occurred before, during, or after the attorney’s service as a judge.

Not all states have provisions that expressly address the issue of disciplinary jurisdiction over pre-bench conduct.  (There will be a comprehensive article on this topic in the summer issue of the Judicial Conduct Reporter, which will be published in August.  To sign up to receive an e-mail notice when the issue comes out, click here.)

Throwback Thursday

Posted on by

Five years ago this month

  • Agreeing with the recommendation of the Judicial Qualifications Commission, the Georgia Supreme Court removed a non-lawyer judge for (1) routinely telling criminal defendants that they had the burden of proving their innocence; (2) allowing defendants to “buy out” the community service portions of their sentences, placing the proceeds into a bank account from which he would authorize the release of funds, and failing to disclose the bank account or turn over the money to the county; (3) abusing and insulting parties appearing in court; (4) ex parte communications; (5) disposing of criminal cases in which the defendants were charged with crimes beyond the jurisdiction of his court; (6) involving himself in a matter not properly before his court and using the prestige of his office to improperly influence a litigant; (7) issuing orders that prohibited the sheriff from awarding “good time” in accordance with a statute; and (8) allowing unqualified persons to serve as court interpreters. Inquiry Concerning Fowler, 696 S.E.2d 644 (Georgia 2010).  The Court also barred the judge from judicial office in the state.
  • The Mississippi Supreme Court suspended a judge for 30 days without pay, reprimanded him, and fined him $1,500 for inappropriately touching a court clerk and using a racially derogatory term to refer to an African-American department of corrections employee. Commission on Judicial Performance v. Brown, 37 So. 3d 14 (Mississippi 2010).

Examples illustrate statistics

Posted on by

The Massachusetts Commission on Judicial Conduct has released its annual report.  The report includes statistics on complaint disposition, and, like all commissions, the Massachusetts commission does not pursue a majority of complaints.  In 2014, for example, the Commission only docketed 56 of the 343 complaints it received.  (Only complaints that “allege specific facts which, if true, would constitute judicial misconduct or disability” are docketed.)

The Commission took action on 68 complaints (some filed in 2013), dismissing 11 after preliminary review, 43 after investigation, and 7 with expressions of concern and informally resolving 7.  The report includes examples that help explain to the public why so many complaints against judges are dismissed every year and also demonstrate how much work the Commission does even on the complaints it dismisses to ensure that meritorious complaints will be discovered and pursued when warranted.

The report summarizes 2 complaints dismissed without investigation after preliminary review.

  • The Commission voted there was no good cause to investigate a stale complaint about hearings that occurred approximately 11 years before the plaintiff filed the complaint. A represented plaintiff in a civil matter alleged that a judge had intentionally failed to follow the law, violated his constitutional rights, and improperly failed to recuse himself.  The Commission’s preliminary inquiry, which “consisted of reviewing the materials submitted by the plaintiff and asking the plaintiff for any additional evidence to support his allegations,” “yielded no evidence to support this complaint.”
  • The Commission dismissed as frivolous or unfounded a complaint by a self-represented plaintiff in a civil matter that alleged a judge was biased against him because he represented himself while the defendant had counsel and that the judge failed to grant him a full opportunity to be heard. The Commission reviewed the materials submitted by the plaintiff, asked the plaintiff for any additional evidence, and reviewed the docket sheet, but “the plaintiff was unable to provide any evidence, other than decisions within the legal discretion of the judge, to support his allegations.”

The report provides 3 examples of complaints dismissed after investigation.

  • A represented defendant in a criminal matter alleged that a judge threatened to send him to jail if he did not plead guilty. The investigation, which included reviewing the materials submitted by the defendant, asking the defendant for any additional evidence to support his allegations, listening to the audio record of the plea hearing, and reviewing court documents from the criminal matter, “revealed that the judge conducted a normal plea colloquy and did not coerce the defendant into pleading guilty.”
  • A self-represented criminal defendant alleged that a judge treated him discourteously, created an appearance of bias against him, and failed to grant him a full opportunity to be heard. The investigation, which included listening to the audio records, reviewing materials submitted by the complainant, reviewing the docket sheets, and communicating with the judge, “revealed that the judge’s treatment of the defendant was professional and appropriate, that the judge exhibited no bias, and that the defendant was given a full opportunity to be heard.”
  • A self-represented defendant in a housing matter alleged that a judge failed to grant him a full opportunity to be heard. The investigation, which included reviewing the materials submitted by the defendant, asking the defendant for any additional evidence, listening to the audio record of the hearing, and reviewing court documents, “revealed that the judge had given the defendant a full opportunity to be heard.”

The report summarizes 2 complaints the Commission dismissed with expressions of concern.

  • A represented defendant in a civil matter alleged that a judge treated him and his counsel discourteously and displayed bias against them. The investigation, which included reviewing the audio records of 8 hearings, reviewing the docket sheets, and interviewing the defendant and the judge, “revealed that the judge did raise his voice and address the defendant’s counsel with an irritated, impatient tone” but “did not reveal any evidence that the judge acted in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to believe he was biased.”  The Commission dismissed the “complaint while expressing its concern to the judge regarding the manner in which he addresses parties appearing before him.”
  • The Commission initiated a complaint alleging that a judge created an appearance of bias by questioning a party aggressively during a several day long civil trial in which all parties were represented by counsel. The investigation included reviewing the audio recordings of the entire trial, interviewing a witness, and interviewing the judge.  The Commission dismissed the complaint “while expressing its concern to the judge that, in the future, he consider whether the manner in which he chooses to question a witness could lead a reasonable person to believe that he has made a prejudgment or is biased.”

The report summarizes 2 informal adjustments/agreed dispositions.

  • The investigation of 3 complaints against a judge established that the judge had engaged in a pattern of treating parties appearing before him discourteously. The judge agreed to retire.
  • The investigation of 2 complaints relating to 2 separate criminal matters established that the judge had, in 1 of the matters, treated the defendant discourteously and had failed to be faithful to the law and, in the other matter, had failed to grant 1 of the parties a full opportunity to be heard and failed to be faithful to the law. Pursuant to an agreed disposition, the Commission privately admonished the judge, and the judge agreed to be monitored by the Commission and to meet regularly with a mentor judge for 1 year.  If the judge complies with the conditions, the complaint will be closed at the end of that period and remain confidential.

(A footnote notes that the summaries use only masculine pronouns to prevent identifying any of the participants.)

Most of the docketed complaints contained multiple allegations.The most frequent allegation was denial of a full opportunity to be heard, appearing in 64.3% of the complaints.  Bias or prejudice was the second most frequent allegation, appearing in 44.6% of complaints.  Of those, 20.0% alleged bias against criminal defendants and 16.0% alleged bias against self-represented litigants.  Of the complaints alleging bias, bias against a particular gender and against the elderly or disabled each appeared in 12.0% of the complaints.  Racial bias and socio-economic bias each appeared in 8.0% of complaints alleging bias.  Other types of bias were alleged in the remaining 44.0% of complaints alleging bias.  Disagreement with decisions and rulings appeared in 32.1% of the complaints (although that is not, standing alone, an allegation of misconduct).  Inappropriate demeanor was alleged in 44.6% of complaints.  Denial of constitutional rights appeared in 17.9% of complaints.  Failure to follow the law or incompetence was alleged in 10.5% of complaints.  Abuse of authority and bringing the judiciary into disrepute were each alleged in 7.1% of complaints.  Administrative problems and conspiracy were each alleged in 5.4% of complaints.  Coercion to settle or plead and lack of integrity were each alleged in 3.6% of complaints.  Improper ex parte communication and conflict of interest were each alleged in 1.8% of the complaints filed in 2014.

Throwback Thursday

Posted on by

Ten years ago this month

  • Approving the recommendation of the Judicial Qualifications Commission based on a stipulation and agreement, the Florida Supreme Court reprimanded a judge who, in violation of a state statute, had incurred campaign expenses that his campaign account did not have sufficient funds to cover, loaned substantial funds to his campaign, and deposited those funds into his campaign account after the deadline for doing so. Inquiry Concerning Gooding, 905 So. 2d 121 (Florida 2005).
  • Approving the findings and recommendation of the Judicial Qualifications Commission, the Florida Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge for delays in rendering decision in 9 cases and for, in several cases, offering to finally rule if the parties waived the prejudice from the delays. Inquiry Concerning Allawas, 906 So. 2d 1052 (Florida 2005).
  • Adopting the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission based on stipulated facts, the Louisiana Supreme Court publicly censured a judge for retaining his girlfriend to summarize medical records for cases in his court, paying her with taxpayer funds, and using taxpayer money to enable her to become a certified legal nurse consultant. In re Granier, 906 So. 2d 417 (Louisiana 2005).
  • Based on the recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Performance, the Mississippi Supreme Court removed a judge for interfering with the prosecution of a domestic violence case against his son and threatening the victim when she complained to the Commission. Commission on Judicial Performance v. Brown, 918 So.2d 1247 (Mississippi 2005).
  • Accepting the determination of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct, the New York Court of Appeals removed a judge for his systematic failure to apply statutory requirements regarding the award of legal fees to the counsel for the public administrator and appointing a friend as counsel to the public administrator and then making unsubstantiated awards of several million dollars in fees to him. In the Matter of Feinberg, 833 N.E.2d 1204 (New York 2005).
  • Pursuant to the recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission, the North Carolina Supreme Court censured a judge for sexual harassment. In re Daisy, 614 S.E.2d 529 (North Carolina 2005).  The judge had hugged and touched a judicial assistant and a paralegal and engaged in physical contact with them that could reasonably be interpreted as, and that they considered to be, unwanted, uninvited, and inappropriate.  The judge had stipulated that his conduct violated the code of judicial conduct and constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
  • Based on stipulated facts and the judge’s agreement, the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a judge for (1) appearing to personally solicit campaign contributions in 3 e-mails from his campaign committee, (2) asking an attorney to explain why a campaign sign endorsing his opponent was displayed in front of the attorney’s office building, and (3) contributing $75 to a congressional campaign. In re Krouse, Stipulation, Agreement, and Order of Reprimand (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct June 1, 2005) (http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/CJC_Activity/public_actions.htm).

Not just a slap on the wrist

Posted on by

Before oral arguments on June 3, Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice Jorge Labarga called Judge Jessica Recksiedler to the podium and, on behalf of the Court, publicly reprimanded her for giving incomplete and inaccurate answers in interviews with a judicial nominating commission.  The reprimand was in accordance with a previous order approving a stipulation, findings of fact, and recommended discipline.  Inquiry Concerning Recksiedler, 161 So. 3d 398 (Florida 2015).

The Chief Justice began by remarking to the judge about “how sad a day this is for you, for us, and for the entire judicial system.”  Noting that the reprimand “is being broadcast throughout the state,” he explained, “it is one way we can assure the public that we take ethical misconduct by a judge very seriously and that we will not hesitate to punish errant judges in a most public way.”  He then described the judge’s misconduct and the conclusions of the Judicial Qualifications Commission and the Court.  Encouraging the judge to review the Court’s prior judicial discipline decisions, the Chief Justice noted that a number involved a single violation with no subsequent misconduct and expressed the Court’s hope that “this will also be the case with you.”  He concluded by emphasizing that the Court’s decisions indicate that “a second ethical breach will be viewed much more harshly.”

The reprimand lasted for over 5 minutes and can be viewed here.  (Since 1997, the Court’s oral argument proceedings have been televised, recorded, and archived by WFSU-TV.)

The Florida Court’s practice of ordering judges to appear before it for a reprimand has been in place since at least 2000.  In Inquiry Concerning Frank, 753 So. 2d 1228 (Florida 2000), the Court explained that it had “come to conclude that when the conduct of a jurist is so egregious as to require a public reprimand, such reprimand should be issued in person with the defaulting jurist appearing before this Court.”

The practice is not widespread in judicial discipline proceedings, but Florida is not unique.  For example, last July, Chief Justice Mike McGrath called Judge Todd Baugh to the rostrum in the Montana Supreme Court courtroom and delivered the Court’s public censure, in accordance with its previous opinion, for his comments in sentencing a teacher for sexual intercourse without consent with a 14-year-old student, imposing an unlawful sentence, attempting to retract his sentence, and making inappropriate public statements attempting to justify his actions.  He was also suspended for 31 days without pay.  Inquiry Concerning Baugh, 334 P.3d 352 (Montana 2014).  A video of the reprimand proceedings was published by the Billings Gazette here.

In some states, an in-person public reprimand is administered locally.  For example, the Chief Judge of the Appalachian Judicial Circuit recently administered a public reprimand to County Probate Judge Pamela Wooley in open court at the Habersham County Courthouse.  Pursuant to the judge’s agreement, the reprimand and a 4-month suspension without pay had been ordered by the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission for failing to complete a mandatory mentoring program but certifying that she had.  The Commission’s rules define a public reprimand as “a public communication administered by a judicial officer which declares a judge’s conduct unacceptable under one of the grounds for judicial discipline but not so serious as to warrant a censure” (emphasis added).

The Mississippi Supreme Court’s judicial discipline decisions also reflect a policy requiring the in-person administration of a public reprimand.  For example, when it ordered Judge Neil Harris reprimanded and fined him $2,500 for abusing his contempt powers, based on an agreed statement of facts and joint recommendation, the Court ordered that “the public reprimand shall be read in open court by the presiding judge of the Jackson County Circuit Court on the first day of the next term of that court in which a jury is present after the issuance of this court’s mandate, with Judge Harris in attendance.”  Commission on Judicial Performance v. Harris, 131 So. 3d 1137 (Mississippi 2013).

Rule 6e of the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct provides that a “judge shall personally appear before the commission to receive an order imposing a reprimand or a censure.”

All states (except Oklahoma) have a sanction option such as reprimand, admonition, or censure (or sometimes a combination), although in most states the reproof is administered in writing, published on a web-site or in an official report.  A recently up-dated list of judicial discipline sanctions available in the states is now on the Center for Judicial Ethics web-site here.  “Determining the Appropriate Sanction” will be one of the topics at the 24th National College on Judicial Conduct and Ethics, October 28-30, 2015 in Chicago.  Examining recent judicial discipline cases, the session will review the criteria for imposing sanctions and discuss issues such as the relevance of a judge’s failure to express remorse and when removal is appropriate.  Participants will “vote” on what sanctions they would have imposed in actual judicial discipline cases.  Registration is now available.

Throwback Thursday

Posted on by

20 years ago this month:

  • Adopting the findings of the Judicial Tenure Commission, the Michigan Supreme Court censured a judge who, after the chief judge had hung up on him, entered the chief judge’s courtroom and created a disturbance while court was in session. In re Moore, 535 N.W.2d 790 (Michigan 1995).  The judge had stipulated to the findings and consented to a public censure.
  • Concurring in the determination of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct, the New Jersey Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a part-time judge for permitting a fax transmission to be sent from his law office to another judge about a pending matter. In the Matter of Carton, 658 A.2d 1211 (New Jersey 1995).
  • Pursuant to a stipulation and agreement, the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct admonished a part-time judge who delayed for approximately 13 months in deciding a small claims case and misplaced the file in his law offices. In re the Matter of Linde, Stipulation and Agreement and Order (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct June 1, 1995) (http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/CJC_Activity/public_actions.htm).

Judicial Conduct Reporter

Posted on by

The spring issue of the Judicial Conduct Reporter has been published.  It has articles on the interpretation of the phrase “the law, the legal system and the administration of justice” and the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, and summaries of recent advisory opinions and recent decisions.  The issue and past issues are available for download at no charge on the Center web-site.  You can sign up to be notified when a new issue is published (and for other NCSC e-newsletters) here.

Problem-causing judges

Posted on by

Last month, the Mississippi Supreme Court removed a judge from office and fined him $3,500 for failing to follow the law in drug court and other misconduct.  Commission on Judicial Performance v. Thompson (Mississippi Supreme Court May 5, 2015).  (He has asked for re-consideration.)  Contrary to statute, participants in the judge’s drug court had been routinely kept in the program for more than 2 years, and the judge had enrolled participants from other jurisdictions that did not have drug courts even after receiving an opinion from the attorney general advising him not to do so.  In addition, without adequate notice or hearings, participants were arrested and jailed for “contempt of orders of the drug court” that were discussed at “staffing meetings” at which they were not present and even though they were in the program for offenses that were not punishable with jail time.  The Court noted that the judge’s “apparent defense . . .was that, because it was drug court in which incarceration was a ‘sanction,’ he did not have to use contempt-of-court procedures because ‘drug court is different from regular court.’”

Unfortunately, Judge Thompson is not the only drug court judge who apparently exaggerated the differences between problem-solving courts and traditional courts.  In March, based on his agreement not to serve in judicial office again, the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications concluded its investigation of a former judge’s conduct and supervision of a county drug court program.  In the Matter of Jacobi, Stipulation and agreement (Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications March 13, 2015).  The Commission was investigating allegations that the judge had failed to advise participants that they had the right to an attorney before admitting to the violation of a drug court rule that could result in deprivation of liberty; that some drug court participants had spent unnecessary time in jail or were unlawfully detained because the judge had failed to supervise or train court staff; and that the judge had permitted a practice in which initial hearings on alleged drug court rule violations, work release violations, or crimes were not immediately scheduled after participants were arrested.

Last week, according to news reports, a state grand jury indicted now former judge Amanda Williams for making false statements and violating her oath of office by falsely stating during a hearing before the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission that she had not given directions to the sheriff’s office regarding the incarceration of a drug court participant.

In March 2011, the National Public Radio program “This American Life” broadcast an episode that concluded the way then-judge Williams ran her drug court violated “the basic philosophy of all drug courts.”  In November 2011, the Commission filed a notice of formal proceedings that alleged Judge Williams, in addition to other misconduct, had a practice of holding drug court participants indefinitely without a hearing and a policy of delaying their placement into treatment; showed favoritism to certain participants; engaged in a pattern of improper ex parte communications with regard to who would be admitted to drug court and acted as a “gatekeeper” for the drug court; expressed bias in criminal matters in the drug court; failed to be patient, dignified, and courteous; and made false representation to the Commission.  For example, the notice alleged that the judge had ordered Lindsey Dills confined “until further order of the court” for violating her drug court contract and directed that she was “not to have any telephone privileges and no one is to contact or visit her except [the drug court counselor]!   Nobody!  Total restriction!”  Dills remained in custody for approximately 73 days and attempted suicide while in solitary confinement.  In December 2011, based on the judge’s resignation and agreement not to serve in judicial office again, the Commission dismissed the notice.  In re Williams, Consent Order (Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission December 19, 2011).

What happens when a judge on a problem-solving court becomes a judicial discipline problem will be one of the topics discussed in a session on judicial ethics and problem-solving courts at the 24th National College on Judicial Conduct and Ethics, October 28-30, 2015, in Chicago.  Registration is now available.  The session will also consider ethical guidance for judges on problem-solving courts about issues such as ex parte communications, demeanor, fund-raising, and disqualification.

Recent cases

Posted on by
  • The Arkansas Commission on Judicial Discipline and Disability publicly reprimanded a judge for a 17-month delay in entering a decision in a divorce case following the final hearing.
  • The California Commission on Judicial Performance publicly admonished a judge for (1) being aggressive and heavy-handed when interacting with a member of court administration regarding the re-assignment of another judge’s courtroom clerk and (2) summoning an attorney to his chambers and suggesting that a declaration regarding the disqualification of the other judge should not be filed due to his concerns about the court’s reputation and the other judge’s family.
  • Based on a stipulation for discipline by consent and the judge’s irrevocable resignation, the California Commission on Judicial Performance censured a former judge and barred him holding judicial office for failing to include on financial disclosure forms $250,000 he received from the dissolution of a joint venture in a county contract for indigent defense and failing to disclose or disqualify when attorneys who had an interest in the contract appeared before him.
  • Agreeing with the recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Performance, the Mississippi Supreme Court removed a judge and fined him $3,500 for (1) failing to follow the law in drug court; (2) attending a meeting between a suspended bail bondsman and the sheriff; and (3) depriving a drug court participant of her right to counsel of her choice by threatening to hold her retained counsel in contempt if she did not sit down.
  • Based on a stipulation and agreement, the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline publicly reprimanded a judge for abusing her contempt power and failing to be honest with the Commission.
  • Granting a stipulation agreement and consent to discipline, the New Mexico Supreme Court placed a judge on supervised probation with a formal mentorship until the end of her term and imposed numerous conditions.  The Commission on Judicial Standards had alleged a variety of misconduct, including administrative failures, ex parte communications, taking action in cases from which she was recused, and denying defendants due process.
  • The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct  reprimanded a judge for (1) treating attorneys from the State Counsel for Offenders office and one of their expert witnesses in a less than patient, dignified, and courteous manner and (2) statements he made during a presentation about sex offenders before the Texas Patriots PAC.
  • The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct admonished a judge for (1) holding a “marathon” court session that lasted until 4:00 a.m.; (2) describing the district attorney as a “New York Jew;” (3) expelling the district attorney from her courtroom; and (4) telling a prosecutor his beard made him look “like a Muslim.”
  • The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct admonished a former judge for failing to provide public documents and information to citizens regarding cases in her court; failing to timely execute the business of the court; failing to hold jury or bench trials; failing to reduce her rulings to final, written, appealable judgments; failing to maintain proper records; and failing to conduct proper fiscal management.
  • The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct admonished a former judge for failing to treat certain attorneys with patience, dignity, and courtesy and repeatedly attempting to intervene in recusal proceedings.
  • Based on a stipulation and agreement, the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct censured a former part-time judge for under-reporting income she received as a judge and thereby collecting unemployment benefits to which she was not entitled..

24th National College on Judicial Conduct and Ethics

Posted on by

Registration is available for the 24th National College on Judicial Conduct and Ethics, held by the Center for Judicial Ethics of the National Center for States Courts in Chicago, October 28-30, 2015.  The College will provide a forum for discussion of professional standards for judges and current issues in judicial discipline.  The College will begin Wednesday October 28 with registration starting at 2:00 and a reception from 5:30 to 7:00.  On Thursday, there will be a plenary session, followed by five 90-minute break-out sessions through Friday noon.  The topics for discussion are described below.  The registration fee is $375 through August 31, 2015, but $400 beginning September 1.  The registration is not refundable unless cancellation is received in writing prior to October 14, 2015

Hotel Information
Room reservations must be made directly with the hotel.  National College room rates at the EMBASSY SUITES by HILTON Chicago-Downtown/Lakefront (+16.4% occupancy tax) are: Single rate $219, Double rate $219, Triple rate $239, Quad rate $259.  Rates include complimentary guestroom internet access, cooked-to-order breakfast, and nightly manager’s reception for attendees staying at the hotel. Reservation cut-off is October 5, 2015, or when the College block is filled.  Upon availability, rooms may be reserved at the College rates for three days prior and/or three after the meeting event dates. To obtain the College rates, you must use/reference the group code “NCJ” when you make reservations at 800-HILTONS [800-445-8667] or click the hotel link on the College page.  The EMBASSY SUITES by HILTON Chicago-Downtown/ Lakefront is located at 511 North Columbus Drive, Chicago,

Sessions

Compare and Contrast: Judicial Discipline Systems  No two state judicial discipline systems are alike, differing by constitution, statute, rule, policy, and practice, but each system has the same goal — effectively and fairly preserving the integrity of and public confidence in the judicial system.  To help states learn from each other, this session will compare the variations on issues such as structure (for example, separating the investigative and adjudicative functions), the role of the supreme court, sanctions, forms, and confidentiality.  Moderators:  Victoria B. Henley, Director-Chief Counsel, California Commission on Judicial Performance • Michael Schneider, Executive Director and General Counsel, Florida Commission on Judicial Qualifications • Cynthia Gray, Director, National Center for State Courts Center for Judicial Ethics

The 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct: Eight Years Later  This session will review the adoption status of the 2007 American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct including additions, omissions, and revisions states have made to the model as they adopted it.  Participants will also consider any questions that have arisen in interpreting the model and any gaps that have been discovered in applying the model.  Moderators:  James J. Alfini, Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, South Texas College of Law • Justice Daniel J. Crothers, North Dakota Supreme Court; Chair, American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility Policy Implementation Committee

The Constitutionality of Restrictions on Judges’ Political Conduct  The U.S. Supreme Court 2002 decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White spawned numerous challenges to restrictions on the campaign and political conduct of judges and judicial candidates.  In April, the Court weighed in again, upholding the prohibition on personal solicitation of campaign contributions in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar.  This session will review the post-White case-law in light of Williams-Yulee and discuss the future of the canons.  Moderators:  Leslie W. Abramson, Professor of Law, D. Louis Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville • Matthew Menendez, Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice Democracy Program, New York University School of Law

Do you know who I am?” The Prestige of Judicial Office  From letters of recommendation, to traffic stops, to personal disputes, to helping out family and friends — judges are often tempted to mention their title and position.  This session will discuss the proper uses and inappropriate abuses of judicial prestige.  Moderators:  Raymond J. McKoski, Retired Judge, 19th Judicial Circuit Court; Member, Illinois Judicial Ethics Committee • Robert H. Tembeckjian, Administrator and Counsel, New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct

Ex Parte Communications  The prohibition on judges’ initiating, permitting, and considering ex parte communications is one of the core principles of due process as well as the code of judicial conduct and a frequent basis for complaints and discipline.  This session will examine current and recurring issues such as independent investigations, what to do after an inadvertent ex parte communication, and communications “authorized by law.”  Moderators:  Judge Wanda G. Bryant, North Carolina Court of Appeals; Chair, Judicial Standards Commission • Judge Edward C. Moss, 17th Judicial District, Brighton, Colorado

Problem-solving Courts and Judicial Ethics  Hundreds of special courts have been established to try a different approach to problems such as drug addiction, domestic violence, and mental illness.  This session will consider the ethical issues raised for judges who preside in these courts where their role differs significantly from the judge’s role in traditional courts. Among the topics to be covered: ex parte communications, demeanor, fund-raising, and disqualification. In addition, participants will discuss what happens when a problem-solving judge becomes a judicial discipline problem.  Moderators:  Judge Julie J. Bernard, First Justice, Brockton District Court; Member, Massachusetts Commission on Judicial Conduct • Judge Nanci J. Grant, Chief Judge, 6th Circuit Court; Member, Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission • Judge Leroy D. Kirby, Adams County Court Judge; Member, Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline

Robe-itis: Causes and Cures  Court observers have postulated that some judges seem to come down with “black robe disease” or “robe-itis,” in which the power of the office makes them more arrogant and less congenial. Considering psychological and social science perspectives as well as judicial experience, this session will examine the possible explanations for the phenomena and the measures conduct commissions and others can take to prevent and remedy it.  Moderators: Jeremy Fogel, Director, Federal Judicial Center • Gerald T. Kaplan, M.A., L.P., Executive Director of Alpha Human Services and Alpha Service Industries; Member, Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards • Judge Joyce Williams Warren, 6th Judicial District, Little Rock; Member, Arkansas Commission on Judicial Discipline and Disability

Determining the Appropriate Sanction  Examining recent judicial discipline cases, this session will review the criteria for imposing sanctions and discuss issues such as the relevance of a judge’s failure to express remorse and when removal is appropriate.  Participants will “vote” on what sanctions they would have imposed in actual judicial discipline cases.  Moderators:  Steven Scheckman, Schiff, Scheckman & White LLP • Judge John P. Erlick, King County Superior Court; Member, Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct

The Role of Public Members  Participants will share their experiences as public members of judicial conduct commissions and discuss what impact their perspective has on deliberations, training, and the perception of the commissions by the public and judges.  Moderators:  Joyce Jennings, Member, Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission • Carol LeBlanc, Member, Louisiana Judiciary Commission • Lois Richins, Member, Utah Judicial Conduct Commission

Introduction to the Canons for New Members of Judicial Conduct Commissions  This session will give new members of judicial conduct commissions an overview of the ethical standards they will be enforcing and focus on those provisions that result in the most judicial discipline cases.  Moderators:  Judge Randall L. Cole, Presiding Circuit Judge for the 9th Judicial Circuit; Member, Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission • Adrienne Meiring, Counsel, Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications