Throwback Thursday

5 years ago this month:

  • Based on a stipulation, the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards publicly reprimanded a judge for (1) failing to follow the law in 6 cases, (2) improper ex parte orders in 4 cases, (3) chronic tardiness and related misconduct, and (4) discourtesy to court staff; the Board also required the judge to comply with conditions, including submitting a plan to address the causes of his misconduct and identifying a mentor. In the Matter of Cahill, Public reprimand and conditions (Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards April 21, 2014).
  • The Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards publicly reprimanded a judge for (1) failing to supervise his law clerk and approving inaccurate time sheets, (2) refusing to allow a defendant to withdraw his plea, (3) trying a defendant in absentia, and (4) discourtesy to a psychologist; the Board also imposed conditions on the judge including completing an anger management program or therapy, identifying a mentor, and writing a letter of apology to the psychologist. In the Matter of Walters, Public reprimand and conditions (Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards April 22, 2014).
  • Agreeing with the recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, to which the judge consented, the Nebraska Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge for instructing jail personnel to release a friend, who had been arrested on a felony drunk driving charge, from jail on his own recognizance before arraignment. In re Complaint Schatz, 845 N.W.2d 273 (Nebraska 2014).
  • Pursuant to the judge’s agreement, the New Hampshire Judicial Conduct Committee publicly reprimanded a former judge for statements in a meeting with public defenders that could reasonably be interpreted as manifesting bias based on gender. Lewis, Reprimand (New Hampshire Judicial Conduct Committee April 1, 2014).
  • The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly censured a judge for (1) riding in a police car with a defendant after arraigning him, recommending that the defendant hire an attorney who was the judge’s business partner, giving him legal advice, and presiding over the case; (2) using his judicial title to promote his law firm and business; (3) imposing fines that exceeded the maximum authorized by law; and (4) making improper political contributions. In the Matter of Burke, Determination (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct (April 21, 2014).
  • The Tennessee Board on Judicial Conduct publicly censured a former child support magistrate for changing a child’s name from “Messiah,” applying her own religious beliefs in her decision, and publicly commenting on her decision while the case was still pending. In re Ballew, Opinion (Tennessee Board on Judicial Conduct April 25, 2014).
  • The Utah Supreme Court approved the implementation of the Judicial Conduct Commission order, based on a stipulation, publicly reprimanding a judge for yelling at a grandfather in an adoption hearing. In re Andrus, Order (Utah Supreme Court April 23, 2014).

Judicial responsibility:  Reasonable measures, confrontation, and supervision

One of the features of the high ethical standards to which judges are held is that sometimes judges get in trouble for something someone else did.

For example, a Florida judge was sanctioned for submitting financial disclosure reports for 2016 and 2017 that failed to disclose 3 free trips she had taken with her husband — even though she had not known the trips were free and even though the reports had been completed by her husband, who managed their family finances.  The judge and her husband had received free accommodations from a hotel chain, allegedly as part of an illegal compensation scheme for her husband’s assistance with permitting problems while he was director of the Miami Beach Building Department.  The judge was held responsible for the inaccurate reports because she failed to take reasonable steps to stay apprised of her financial circumstances, failed to ask who paid for the trips, and failed to verify the accuracy of the reports despite certifying to their veracity when she signed them.  Pursuant to a stipulation, she was suspended for 90 days without pay, fined $5,000, and publicly reprimanded.  Ortiz (Florida Supreme Court January 29, 2019).  (The Court had rejected 2 prior stipulations that imposed less severe sanctions.)

A New Mexico judge was sanctioned, in part, for receiving at his court e-mail address numerous e-mails from his family members, particularly his cousin, that were offensive, degrading, pornographic, racist, and sexist.  The judge testified that, after he received the first inappropriate e-mail, he told his cousin, “Cuz, you got to stop this,” and that he told family members over and over again to stop sending e-mails to his judicial e-mail address, but they continued to use that address.  In its findings, the Judicial Standards Commission noted that the judicial information division had instructed the judge how he could put an end to the e-mails, but he had not followed their instructions.

The Commission stated:

The Respondent maintained his innocence throughout the entirety of the inquiry by stating that he only received the e-mails and should not be punished for merely being a recipient.  His position is that his relatives sent him completely inappropriate sexual, derogatory, racist, and sexist e-mails to his judicial e-mail, that he provided to them, that he told them to quit and they didn’t, so it is their fault even though Respondent could have stopped them by changing his judicial e-mail but he didn’t want them to feel like they were the bad guy.

The Commission concluded:

It is far beyond negligent, and not the result of mere carelessness or lack of computer skills, that Respondent was unwilling to stop his relatives from sending him offensive e-mails of a sexual, racist, sexist, derogatory nature over a period of many years. . . .  The Respondent’s behavior in not confronting his family members and stopping the e-mails is offensive and shows that the Judge was indifferent to the impact of his actions on his reputation and integrity and the impact on the reputation and integrity of the judiciary as a whole.

Adopting the Commission’s findings, the New Mexico Supreme Court ordered the now-former judge never to hold judicial office in the state.  In the Matter of Castaneda, Order (New Mexico Supreme Court February 12, 2018).

A California judge was sanctioned for his testimonial published on a business’s web-site identifying the author as a superior court judge and including a photograph of the judge in his judicial robe.  The judge did not authorize the use of his title or provide the photograph or authorize its use or even know the photograph would be used.  However, neither did he review the final text of the testimonial or instruct the business not to use his judicial title and photograph in judicial robes or even ask how his comments would be used or where they would be published.

The judge had retained the Redd Group to survey voters about a local attorney’s judicial campaign.  After the election, the judge called David Cooper, an employee of the Redd Group, to compliment him on the survey results.  Cooper asked if he could use the judge’s comments as a testimonial for the Redd Group.  The judge agreed.  The testimonial, published on the Redd Group web-site, stated:

I was helping a fellow attorney run for county judge.  Our mail went out ahead of schedule and The Redd Group accommodated for our poll to be done accordingly with many more respondents than were promised.  We got the detailed results in less than 24 hours.  I recommend the Redd Group for all your polling needs.  Excellent work! – Steven C. Bailey

The California Commission on Judicial Performance publicly censured the now-former judge and barred him from seeking or holding judicial office for this and other misconduct (see also  discussion below).  Inquiry Concerning Bailey, Decision and order (California Commission on Judicial Performance February 27, 2019).

* * *
Several judges have been sanctioned for content on their Facebook pages posted by others to whom they had delegated the task without sufficient oversight.  For example, the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct admonished a judge for Facebook posts advertising a school supply drive, soliciting donations for an individual, and advertising his donation of a rifle to a charitable raffle — even though a member of his judicial staff handled his Facebook page, many posts were made without his prior authorization, and he was often unaware of what appears on his page.  Public Admonition of Metts (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct October 3, 2018).  Similarly, the Texas Commission reprimanded a judge for campaign advertisements for other candidates posted on his Facebook page, in addition to other misconduct — even though he had not authorized the posts and did not know about them until he received the Commission’s inquiry.  Public Reprimand of Lopez (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct June 6, 2018).

Unauthorized and inappropriate posts have also been a problem on judicial campaign Facebook pages.

For example, the Florida Supreme Court removed a judge for criticism of her campaign opponent for representing criminal defendants on a Facebook page that was created by an electioneering communications organization formed by her campaign consultant.  Inquiry Concerning Santino, 257 So.3d 25 (Florida 2018).  The Court held that the judge’s actions “—individually and through her campaign, for which she was ultimately responsible—unquestionably eroded public confidence in the judiciary.”  The Court emphasized the finding of the hearing panel that nothing in the code of judicial conduct permitted, “Santino to delegate to her campaign manager the responsibility for written materials created or distributed by the campaign.”

The Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline reprimanded a former judge for a photoshopped picture of herself and an actor that her campaign manager had posted on her campaign Facebook page, which misled the public that “the Rock” had endorsed her campaign, and for her subsequent comment on the post:  “I’m ‘almost’ taller than him.  Almost.”  In the Matter of Almase, Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and imposition of discipline (Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline October 22, 2018).  The Commission found that the judge had not taken reasonable measures to ensure that her campaign representatives complied with the code of judicial conduct, noting her contract with her campaign manager did not contain any restrictions on the posting of social media materials, such as obtaining prior approval from the judge, that the judge did not discuss with her campaign representatives the prohibitions in the code, and that the judge failed to properly supervise her campaign representatives.  The Commission took the “opportunity to remind judicial candidates that campaign-related social media platforms, such as Facebook, maintained by a campaign committee or others, do not insulate them from the strictures of the Code.”

* * *
The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a former judge for publicly disclosing his candidacy for sheriff without resigning and initially refusing to disclose to the Commission the identity of the individual who took his campaign Facebook page live.  Barth, Order (Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct February 14, 2019).

The California Commission on Judicial Performance publicly censured a now-former judge and barred him from seeking or holding judicial office for permitting a campaign coordinator to use his judicial title on the Facebook page for his campaign for attorney general and in posts on her law firm’s Facebook page promoting his candidacy, in addition to other misconduct (see also discussion above).  Inquiry Concerning Bailey, Decision and order (California Commission on Judicial Performance February 27, 2019).

In 2016, Martha Romero, the judge’s Southern California Campaign Coordinator, created the “Judge Steven Bailey” Facebook page for the judge’s campaign for state attorney general.  (Judges in California are allowed to run for another office if they take a leave of absence; the judge’s failure to take a leave of absence was another grounds for his discipline.)  In November and December 2016, several posts on the page promoting his campaign referred to the judge by his judicial title.

Rejecting the judge’s argument that he cannot restrict the First Amendment rights of others, the Commission agreed with the masters’ finding that “the judge had an obligation to take some action to prevent the improper use of his title in connection with campaign communications and events, even if it was just to instruct Romero to ensure that the Facebook page did not refer to his judicial title and position” because she was a coordinator for and “very involved” in his campaign.  The Commission also agreed that, because the standard for prejudicial conduct assumes that an objective observer is familiar with the facts, “the judge’s failure to supervise a campaign staffer and take any measures to guard against impermissible use of his judicial title would be considered prejudicial to public esteem for the judiciary in the eyes of an objective observer,” rejecting the judge’s argument that “the public would have no way of knowing if he asked Romero not to use his title.”

Romero also maintained a Facebook page for her law firm, the Romero Law Firm.  In a post on that page, Romero included photos of the judge and wrote, “My friend Judge Steven Bailey is running for California Attorney General 2018,  He is not a politician.  Please Help us!” and “Judge Steven Bailey.  Candidate for Attorney General 2018.  He will be the next Attorney General!!!  Please repost.  We need to win this!!”

The Commission acknowledged that the judge “could not force Romero to edit her posts about him or to avoid using his judicial title in future posts” but stated that he could “have asked her to modify her posts to be in compliance with his ethical obligations.”  Rejecting the judge’s argument, the Commission concluded that “Romero’s First Amendment rights are not implicated by requiring the judge to ask her to comply with a request to remove the Facebook posts.”

Throwback Thursday

10 years ago this month:

  • The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a judge for taking action in a case after being disqualified. Lusk, Order (Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct April 7, 2009).
  • Accepting a stipulation for discipline by consent, the California Commission on Judicial Performance publicly censured a judge for routinely leaving the courthouse for the day before noon and after the conclusion of his calendar without receiving authorization from or notifying his supervising judges; the judge also agreed to tender his irrevocable resignation effective October 2, 2009. Inquiry Concerning Sheldon, Decision and Order (California Commission on Judicial Performance April 15, 2009).
  • The Tennessee Court of the Judiciary publicly reprimanded a judge for a delay of 7 years, 5 months, and 21 days in ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief in a capital case. Public Letter to Reprimand of Blackett (Tennessee Court of the Judiciary April 17, 2009).
  • The Tennessee Court of the Judiciary publicly reprimanded a judge for statements about court employees made in open court or the public areas of the clerk’s office. Public Letter of Reprimand to Walton (Tennessee Court of the Judiciary April 13, 2009).
  • Adopting the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct, which the judge accepted, the New Jersey Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge for driving while intoxicated. In the Matter of Jones, Order (New Jersey Supreme Court April 2, 2009). The Court’s order does not describe the judge’s conduct; the summary is based on the Committee’s presentment.
  • The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly warned a justice of the peace for her refusal to accept a forcible detainer action; the Commission also ordered her to obtain 4 hours of instruction with a mentor in addition to her required judicial education. Public Warning of Valadez and Order of Additional Education (Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 27, 2009).
  • Based on a stipulation and agreement, the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a judge for her practice of obtaining witness signatures for marriages from court staff and others who had not witnessed the ceremony. In the Matter of Kato, Stipulation, Agreement and Order (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 10, 2009).
  • Based on a stipulation and agreement, the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a judge for failing to properly advise criminal defendants of their constitutional and procedural rights, including the right to counsel, at arraignment and probation review hearings; failing to properly accept guilty pleas; failing to record all hearings; and failing to use qualified interpreters. In the Matter of Mendoza, Stipulation, Agreement, and Order (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 10, 2009).

Small town friendships

Defining when a judge’s relationship with an attorney or litigant is close enough to raise ethical issues is one of the perpetual issues in judicial conduct, and it was presented twice in the recent case Inquiry Concerning Bailey, Decision and order (California Commission on Judicial Performance February 27, 2019).

One of the grounds for the sanction was that the judge had ordered defendants in 5 cases to use an alcohol monitoring service without disclosing that his son worked for the company and that the owner was a friend.  With respect to the judge’s relationship with the owner of the monitoring company (Charles Holland), the California Commission on Judicial Performance emphasized several factors that required disclosure:

  • Prior to taking the bench, the judge had represented Holland,
  • Holland had referred clients to the judge prior to his taking the bench,
  • Holland had been to the judge’s home,
  • Holland had attended strategy meetings for the judge’s judicial campaign, and
  • The judge was one of Holland’s Facebook friends.

The Commission stated that, even if it accepted the judge’s characterization of the relationship as “more professional than social,” he and Holland were more than members of the same professional organization and had contact outside professional events.  The Commission concluded that, “[e]ven if each of these facts taken alone did not require disqualification, . . . the totality of these circumstances was reasonably relevant to disqualification and required disclosure.”

A second ground for the sanction was the judge’s appointment of an attorney (Bradley Clark) as a special master without disclosing that Clark personal friend.  The Commission emphasized several factors:

  • The judge and Clark socialized together, sometimes with their spouses,
  • The judge received gifts from Clark,
  • The judge’s nephew was employed by Clark, and
  • The judge officiated over Clark’s wedding.

The special masters in the disciplinary proceeding had found that the appointment was not misconduct because Clark was qualified and, therefore, it had not been proven that the appointment was based on the friendship, rather than competence.  The master also found that disclosure was not necessary because most members of the “small legal community” where the judge sat probably knew about the relationship.  The Commission deferred to the finding about the appointment, but found that the judge did have a duty to disclose the relationship “regardless of the size of the community.”  It explained:

By their terms, the canons impose uniform statewide standards.  Whenever an assigned case involves a party the judge “knows,” the judge must be particularly vigilant to ensure the appearance and reality of independence and impartiality.  The situation may arise more frequently in a small town than a major metropolitan area, but the judge’s ethical duties are the same irrespective of population statistics.

The risk of applying a different disclosure standard in a small community based on the assumption that the parties and the attorneys know the judge’s relationships “is that there may be someone involved in the proceeding who, in fact, does not know about the relationships.” . . .  Moreover, the purpose of disclosure is not only to inform the attorneys and parties of information that may be relevant to disqualification but to uphold the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

The fact that there was no objection from the attorneys . . . did not relieve the judge of his obligation to disclose.  There is no evidence that the attorneys and parties were aware of the extent of the judge’s relationship with Clark at the time the judge made the appointment.

A third ground for the sanction, not related to friendships, was the judge’s comment to 2 other judges and an administrative analyst in the courthouse that gay men are “snappy” dressers.  The Commission found that statement was misconduct even though the remark “did not perpetuate invidious or hateful stereotypes.”

As observed by the masters, the judge’s comments “reflect stereotypical attitudes about gay men.”  It is improper for a judge to make remarks that reflect stereotypes based on sexual orientation, whether negative or positive.  We agree with the masters that “[s]uch remarks indicate that the speaker has preconceived ideas about a particular group, a characteristic that is contrary to the qualities of impartiality and propriety required of judges by our Code of Judicial Ethics.”

The judge had made the comment in response to a compliment by another judge about his outfit in an open office area in the court’s administration building:  he explained that he had bought the outfit in France, that the salesperson who put it together for him was gay, and that he knew it looked good because gay men are “snappy” dressers.

The other grounds for the sanction were that the judge had (1) allowed a business to use his testimonial on its web-site without assuring that it did not use his judicial title; (2) received improper gifts from Court Appointed Special Advocates, an attorney he had appointed as a master, and a law school; (3) failed to accurately report travel-related payments or reimbursements for attending judicial education programs; (4) run for California Attorney General without taking a leave of absence and then using his judicial title to raise funds for and promote his campaign; (5) failed to file a candidate intention statement until after his campaign had received campaign contributions, in violation of the Political Reform Act; and (6) permitted a campaign coordinator to use his judicial title on the Facebook page for his campaign for Attorney General and in posts on her law firm’s Facebook page promoting his candidacy.  The Commission publicly censured the now-former judge and barred him from seeking or holding judicial office.

Complaining about “a continuous onslaught of allegations,” the judge had blamed the presiding judge and the “toxic environment in the El Dorado Superior Court” for the charges against him.  However, the Commission emphasized  that it was the judge’s “improper conduct that is the basis of this inquiry, regardless of the motivations of those who brought forth the allegations.  There is no evidence that a toxic environment in the court or any animosity between Judge Bailey and [the presiding judge] resulted in misinformation being provided to the commission or inaccuracies in the evidence presented against the judge.”

 

Throwback Thursday

20 years ago this month:

  • Pursuant to the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission based on a stipulation, the Louisiana Supreme Court publicly censured a judge for failing to decide 32 cases for from 1 to 2 years and to decide 14 other cases for from 2 to nearly 3 years, inaccurately and/or delinquently reporting 34 cases taken under advisement, and completely failing to report the undecided status of 7 cases. In re Wimbish, 733 So.2d 1183 (Louisiana 1999).
  • Pursuant to the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission based on a stipulation, the Louisiana Supreme Court publicly censured a judge for (1) maintaining a policy and practice of intentionally refusing to set status conferences or issue scheduling orders, (2) failing and/or refusing to timely sign ex parte orders, (3) 1‑year delays in deciding 2 cases, and (4) failing to report 1 case as under advisement. In re Emanuel, 755 So. 2d 862 (Louisiana 1999).
  • Agreeing with the Commission on Judicial Performance, the Mississippi Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge and fined him $1,500 for, contrary to the law, accepting plea bargains that reduced DUI second offense charges to DUI first offense in 3 cases and reduced DUI charges to disorderly conduct in 1 case. Commission on Judicial Performance v. Jones, 735 So. 2d 385 (Mississippi 1999).
  • Approving a statement of agreed facts and joint recommendation, the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly censured a judge for circumventing normal procedures in appointing guardians, appointing 2 lawyers as law guardians in a disproportionate number of cases, and failing to scrutinize their bills. In the Matter of Ray, Determination (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 26, 1999) (http://cjc.ny.gov/Determinations/R/Ray.Herbert.B.1999.04.26.DET.pdf).
  • The Ohio Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge for speaking at governmental meetings and before a planning commission on behalf of real estate partnerships in which he owned an interest. Ohio State Bar Association v. Reid, 708 N.E.2d 193 (Ohio 1999).
  • Adopting the recommendation of a judicial conduct panel, the Wisconsin Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge for stating, “I suppose it was too much to ask that your daughter keep her pants on and not behave like a slut” when a woman explained she had not been able to pay her fines because she was caring for her daughter’s children and making statements in his letter of apology that manifested a bias based on socioeconomic status. In the Matter of Michelson, 591 N.W.2d 843 (Wisconsin 1999).

Recent cases

  • The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly reprimanded a former judge for disclosing his candidacy for sheriff on Facebook without resigning and refusing to disclose to the Commission the identity of the individual who took his campaign Facebook page live. Barth, Order (Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct February 14, 2019).
  • The Colorado Supreme Court publicly censured a former court of appeals judge and accepted her resignation for (1) disclosing to an intimate, non-spousal partner the vote of a court of appeals division on a case prior to the issuance of the decision and (2) using inappropriate racial epithets in communications with that intimate partner, including a racially derogatory reference to a court of appeals colleague. In the Matter of Booras (Colorado Supreme Court March 11, 2019).
  • Adopting stipulated findings based on the judge’s consent, the Michigan Supreme Court publicly censured a judge for citing cases to prosecutors in 2 cases in ex parte e-mails and referring to the prosecutors as unprofessional, “a fool that I suffered,” and a “cancer” because they disclosed the e-mails to defense council. In re Filip (Michigan Supreme Court March 8, 2019).
  • The Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline publicly censured a judge for using an alternate judge whenever it was his turn to act as on-call search warrant judge for 4 years and failing to cooperate with 3 chief judges; the Commission also ordered the judge to attend the National Judicial College course “Leadership for Judges.” In the Matter of Hastings, Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and imposition of discipline (Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline March 6, 2019).
  • Granting the Judicial Standards Commission’s motion to enforce a stipulation agreement, which the judge did not contest, the New Mexico Supreme Court suspended a judge without pay for 3 weeks for, during a radio interview, misrepresenting the conduct for which he had been censured pursuant to a previous stipulation, thereby violating that agreement. In the Matter of Walton, Order (New Mexico Supreme Court March 12, 2019).
  • Granting the Judicial Standards Commission’s motion to accept a stipulation, the New Mexico Supreme Court ordered the permanent resignation of a judge for failing to immediately resign as a municipal judge when she declared her candidacy for county commission. Inquiry Concerning Encinias, Order (New Mexico Supreme Court March 29, 2019).
  • Based on the report of a referee following a hearing, the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a non-lawyer judge for conveying his personal interest, as a member of the high school basketball referees’ association, in a case involving 2 referees who were accosted after a game by communicating with the judge who was handling the case, the defendant’s attorney, and the district attorney’s office. In the Matter of Forando, Determination (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct March 25, 2019).

 

 

 

 

Throwback Thursdays

25 years ago this month:

  • The California Commission on Judicial Performance publicly reproved a judge for stating to a public defender of Japanese-American ancestry: “Do you have something to add to those papers which isn’t in there, some brilliant case you found somewhere in the Upper Tokyo Reports or somewhere that nobody knows about, tell me about it.  Otherwise there is no need to argue over what you already have.”  Letter to Haugner (California Commission on Judicial Performance April 11, 1994).
  • Adopting a stipulation and the recommendation of the Board on Judicial Standards, the Minnesota Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a judge and suspended him for 60 days without pay for (1) on multiple occasions over several years, responding in an angry and undignified manner to staff members who were innocent of any significant dereliction of duty; (2) ignoring staff members whom he had invited into his chambers, to their evident discomfort; and (3) harshly and without justification criticizing the work of his law clerks. In re Rice, 515 N.W.2d 53 (Minnesota 1994).
  • Pursuant to a stipulation and agreement with the judge, the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a judge for engaging in a casual and cordial conversation in the courtroom with one of the parties in a case that the other party observed, while the attorneys for both parties were discussing settlement outside the courtroom. In re Slusher, Stipulation and Agreement and Order of Admonishment (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct April 1, 1994).
  • Agreeing with the State Commission on Judicial Conduct, the Washington Supreme Court removed a judge from office for filing travel vouchers for 4 out-of-state trips on which he conducted minimal judicial business that was wholly incidental to the personal nature of the trips and seeking reimbursement for car and lodging expenses that went beyond that needed for judicial activities. In re Ritchie, 870 P.2d 967 (Washington 1994).
  • Adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of a 3-judge panel based on a stipulation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended a judge from office for 15 days without pay for failing to decide 2 cases for more than 1 year, filing certificates of pending case status for 6 months that falsely reported that he had no cases pending beyond the prescribed period, misrepresenting to the deputy chief judge that 2 decisions had not been entered because a clerk had failed to type them, and making the same misrepresentation to a Commission investigator. In the Matter of Dreyfus, 513 N.W.2d 604 (Wisconsin 1994).